This section provides additional results related to the mark-up estimates of De-Loecker et al. (2019) (DLEU hereafter). We begin with a brief discussion of the accounting definition of COGS, and its implications for mark-up estimation; followed by a discussion of technological change and it's relation to Sales, General and Administrative (SG&A) expenditures.
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A.2 Role of SG&A and Intangibles
The above issues related to the measurement of variable costs -as well as the treatment of SG&A -pose significant challenges for the estimation. However, even assuming that COGS is a perfect proxy of variable costs and that SG&A is properly accounted for in the production function estimation, there is a more fundamental issue with the interpretation of mark-ups as a proxy of market power: technological change and the rise of fixed costs.
The share of SG&A in total costs has increased over the past 30 years, precisely when the share of COGS has fallen. Table 7 summarizes this fact, by showing the weighted average share of key income statement line items as a percent of sales. The COGS-share of sales declined by nearly 7 percentage points, while the SG&A and depreciation shares increased by 3.5 and 1.3 percentage points, respectively. Thus, most of the decrease in COGS was offset by a rise in SG&A and DP. But operating profits after depreciation also increased, by 2.2 percentage points of sales. The increase in SG&A and depreciation are consistent with a shift towards intangible capital: SG&A includes most intangible-building activities such as R&D, Advertising and Software-development expenses; and intangibles have higher depreciation rates (Corrado and Hulten, 2010) . Most SG&A expenses are fixed in the short-run, which requires a careful treatment while estimating production functions. This is the subject of an ongoing debate (Traina, 2018; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2018) .
To understand the significance of rising SG&A for mark-up estimation, figure 16 shows the salesweighted average of SALE/COGS and SG&A cost-shares (SG&A/COSTS) for firms in the the top quantile of the SALE/COGS distribution each year. As shown, SALE/COGS increased precisely at the firms where the SG&A cost-share increased -which points towards a major technological change, likely involving a rise in fixed costs. This has significant implications for the interpretation of mark-ups as a measure of market power. Two examples. profits remains at the country-level. As a result, rising COGS-based mark-ups -by themselves -tell us little about the long-run evolution of competition and market power. DLEU acknowledge as much, noting that"technological change will lead to higher mark-ups (due to lower marginal costs), but prices will not drop because firms need to generate revenue to cover fixed costs. As a result, profits will continue to be low and higher mark-ups do not imply higher market power." Profits -therefore -remain the only reliable measure of marker power; and the one we focus on here and in related work. Figure 20 presents an additional measure of turnover, based on the correlation of firm rankings over time. For a particular measure Z (sales, market value, etc.), we define
where rank(z i,j,t ) is the rank of firm i in industry j at time t according to the measure z. We again find a sharp increase in persistence after 2000. Figure 21 presents the same results but separating manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. 
B.2 Concentration, Productivity and Prices
We are interested in decomposing the correlation between concentration and mark-ups into the underlying components: prices, wages and labor productivity. In Figure 22 we plot the aggregate evolution of prices and unit labor costs since 1989. As shown, prices increased faster than unit labor costs, leading to an increase in mark-ups. Last, Table 8 reports regressions of the following form using our detailed industry dataset of prices and productivity:
∆ 5 log(Y jt ) = β∆ 5 log(CR4) + γ s,t + ε jt .
where j denotes industries and t denotes years. γ s,t denotes sector x year fixed effects. To facilitate comparison to Ganapati 2018, we standardize ∆ 5 log(CR4) to have mean zero and variance one. Outcome variables Y jt are based on the following interlinked outcomes:
Panel A includes all industries, while Panels B and C separate manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. In line with Autor et al. 2017b and Ganapati 2018, concentration is positively correlated with labor productivity growth. This is what one would expect in a world dominated by fat-tail firm level demand (or quality) shocks. An industry grows because some of its firm draw a large positive shock. This mechanically leads to higher concentration. A doubling of the CR4 is correlated with a 13% increase in labor productivity. Wages rise by only 3% implying that productivity gains are not passed on to workers. Unit labor costs, therefore, fall by 10%. In a competitive economy, this would lead to lower prices and increased welfare for consumers. However, prices remain flat -implying a 11% increase in mark-ups 29 . In figure 24 we show the residual and cumulative gap from the regression K t = β 0 + β 1 Q t−1 + ǫ t , where Q represents Tobin's Q. We run this regression for the entire capital stock and also for the three types of capital reported in BEA's fixed asset tables: Equipment, Structures and Intellectual Property. Intellectual Property
Cumulative gap Residual
Notes: Annual Data. Growth rate of private nonresidential fixed assets; based on section 4.2 of the BEA's fixed assets tables. Q for Non Financial Business sector from US Flow of Funds accounts.
In order to confirm that changes in the profit rate of leaders is not only a between-firms effect but also within-firms, we estimate
where Lead ijt is an indicator equal to one for firms in the top quantile of the market value distribution, by industry; while δ i and γ t denote firm and year fixed effects, respectively. Observations are weighted by sales. Coefficient γ t captures the average within-firm change in profits, while β t captures an incremental effect for leaders firms. We plot β t + γ t as the total effect on leaders. C Appendix for Section 4: PCA Figure 26 shows the loadings on PC1 and PC2, as of 2012, for each industry. 
D Model Appendix

D.1 Demand System
There is a continuum of industries indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] and a continuum of firms i ∈ [0, N j,t ] in each industry. A particular firm is therefore indexed by (i, j), i.e., i'th firm in industry j.
Firms' outputs are aggregated at the industry level as
where σ is the elasticity between different firms in the same industry and h are firm-level demand shocks, with a mean of 1. Industry outputs are aggregated into a final consumption bundlē
where ǫ is the elasticity of substitution between industries. This demand structure implies that there exists an industry price index
such that the demand for good i is given by
Similarly, there exists an aggregate price index
The production function of firm i, j is Cobb-Douglass
and there is a fixed cost of production φ j . Firms take the wage W and the rental rate R as given when they hire capital and labor. The Cobb-Douglass function, like any CRS function, leads to a constant marginal cost
Cost minimization implies that all firms choose the same (optimal) capital labor ratio
If we define the mark-up of price over marginal cost
Then profits are
and the market share is
We use a wide range of aggregate-, industry-and firm-level data, summarized in Table 9 and described in the rest of this section. We begin by describing the three datasets used repeatedly throughout the paper: Compustat North America, Compustat Global and US Economic Census Concentration Ratios (section E.1).
We then discuss how these, and the remaining datasets are used to generate specific results. We apply standard screens (consol = "C", indfmt = "INDL", datafmt = "STD", popsrc = "D"), and ex- to the most common ISIC Level 2 segment (by number of mappings) based on the the concordance. This mapping is one-to-one for most NAICS-6 segments; and for the remaining segments there is usually a single most common ISIC Level 2 segment. For the few cases where NAICS-6 segments map with equal likelihood to more than one ISIC Level 2 segment, we follow the same methodology but with NAICS-5 codes (and so on). 31 We then map each ISIC Rev. 4 Level 2 segments to the 27 EU KLEMS industries.
Concentration Ratios. We use the resulting dataset to compute Compustat-based concentration ratios.
Compustat coverage as a share of the economy varies over time (as more firms go public) and across industries (depending on the nature of production); and the importance of foreign competition varies over time.
To ensure CRs are stable over time and across industries, and account for imports we compute: Other Definitions.
• Market Value of Equity (ME): ME is defined as the total number of common shares outstanding (item CSHO) times the closing stock price at the end of the fiscal year (item PRCC_F). When either CSHO or PRCC_F are missing in Compustat, we fill-in the value using CRSP. If ME is also missing in CRSP, we use PRCC_C x CSHO.
• Market Value (MV): MV is defined as the market value of equity (ME) plus total liabilities (LT) and preferred stock (PSTK)
• Q: firm-level Q is defined as the ratio of market value to total assets (AT). We cap Q at 10 and winsorize it at the 2% level, by year to mitigate the impact of outliers. See Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017b) for a discussion of alternate definitions of Tobin's Q. 31 In some cases, Compustat NAICS codes contain fewer than six digits. In that case, we repeat the process using NAICS-5 to NAICS-2 codes. Firms that cannot be mapped to an ISIC segment (those with NAICS code 999 are excluded from industry-level analyses). Compustat and the latter is provided by Peters and Taylor (2016) .
• Firm Age: Firm age is defined as the number of years over which a firm appears in Compustat, irrespective of whether the underlying data fields satisfy our exclusion restrictions (i.e., we measure age before imposing any exclusion restrictions).
• Ratios: We also compute a variety of ratios as described in the text (e.g., SALE/COGS, XSGA/XOPR).
All of these ratios are winsorized at the 2% and 98% level, by year to mitigate the impact of outliers.
E.1.2 Compustat Global
Global concentration measures are based on Compustat Global, which includes most public firms across advanced economies. Data are available from 1987, but coverage is fairly thin until the late-1990s. We download tables g_funda, g_company and g_exrt_mth via WRDS. We apply the same screens as for the US (consol = "C", indfmt = "INDL", datafmt = "STD", popsrc = "I") and exclude firm-year observations with missing year, sales, assets, or gvkey. 32 We use the exchange rates in exrt_mth to convert all financials to USD. For a few firms, currency codes and financials appear inconsistent -particularly when currency codes change. We therefore drop firms (gvkeys) entirely whenever sales or assets increase or decrease by a factor of 20 in the same year as the currency code changes. Firms are mapped to countries/regions using headquarter location (LOC). We then use the same definitions and mapping procedure as for the US.
E.1.3 Economic Census Concentration Ratios
Last, we obtain sales, employment and payroll data by industry from the US Economic Census' Concentra- Data before 1992 is based on the SIC system. For manufacturing, we use the retrospective tabulation based on unified SIC codes published in the 1992 Economic Census. For non-manufacturing, we use the data as reported, which follows the 1987 SIC system in both 1987 and 1992, though there are small adjustments across years. Data after 1997 is based on NAICS, with each of the 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012 reports using slightly different NAICS vintages. Like Ganapati (2018), we restrict our sample to consistently defined SIC/NAICS codes over each five-year period. Data for service industries are reported by tax-paying segments. We keep tax-payable firms because they are reported consistently over time and are closest to our analysis. Data for wholesale trade are reported as a total and by type of merchant (e.g., merchant wholesaler, manufacturer). We keep only the total. Table 3 shows the coverage of the data. We restrict our sample to the post-1987 period, when concentration increased. There is continuous coverage for the manufacturing sector over the entire time period at the 4-digit SIC and 6-digit NAICS levels. Coverage for non-manufacturing sectors is spottier. Wholesale trade, retail trade and services are covered since 1987, as well as some transportation and communication sectors.
All major industries except agriculture, mining and construction are covered after 1997.
We use these data in four ways: first, we use the reported concentration ratios directly in some of our figures and/or regressions. Second, we compute census-based import-adjusted concentration as
where CR8 jt and sale jt are based on the US Economic Census; and imports jt is based on Peter Schott's data (set to zero when missing). Third, we aggregate census concentration ratios to BEA industries since 1997, for use in the PCA analysis. Census concentration measures follow the NAICS hierarchy, which almost always maps one-to-one to BEA industries. When this is not the case, we first aggregate (domestic) concentration ratios to BEA industries by taking a sales-weighted average; and then apply the import adjustment. For some regressions, we interpolate Census concentration measures between economic census years. Last, we combine the concentration data with price indices from the NBER-CES database for manufacturing and the BEA's detailed GDP by Industry accounts for our analyses of productivity and to US dollars using the OECD's exchange rates, available at link. We define the gross profit rate as the ratio of GOPS to PROD. We aggregate across countries by taking the production-weighted average. manufacturing industries. We complement Compustat with three additional datasets:
• Import and Exports: Import and export data are sourced from Peter Schott's website and was first used in Schott (2008) . Data are available by HS-code x year from 1989 to 2017, but include a mapping to NAICS-6 industries which follows the concordance of Pierce and Schott (2012). We use these data to estimate import penetration and import-adjusted concentration at different levels of granularity (NAICS-6 as well as BEA industries). These files include ∼400 industries, with more than 200 corresponding to manufacturing industries. Ganapati (2018) uses more detailed accounts, but we focus on this higher level of aggregation because, even for these accounts, the BEA acknowledges that "the more detailed estimates are more likely to be either based on judgmental trends, on trends in the higher-level aggregate, or on less reliable source data." Some of the BEA industries aggregate several NAICS codes. We manually map as many codes as possible, and aggregate concentration ratios by taking a weighted average when needed. We then compute quantities, labor productivity and mark-ups as defined in the text -and estimate the regressions. (2016)) by year and by MV group x year. Estimate the share of a given measure -say OIBDP -as the ratio of leader OIBDP to total OIBDP in a given year.
E.2.5 Investment and Profits by Leaders vs. Laggards
Because firms are discrete, the actual share of market value in each grouping varies from year to year. To improve comparability, re-scale shares by the ratio of 33.33% to the share of market value. Report the average across all years in a given period. 
E.2.6 PCA
Our PCA analysis is based on the BEA industries described in Table 10 . We define the data sources and definitions for all measures included in the analysis. The rest of the details are provided in the text. • Import share (import_share): ratio of imports from Peter Schott's data to the sum of gross output and imports.
• BEA Profit Margin (profit_margin_bea): ratio of net operating surplus to gross output as measured by the BEA's GDP by Industry accounts (file GDPbyInd_GO_1947-2017).
• Compustat Median Profit Margin (profit_margin_med_cp): Define firm-level profit margin as the ratio of operating income after depreciation to sales (OIADP/SALE). Compute the median across all firms in a given industry x year.
• US KLEMS inputs:
-Labor Share (ls_kl) defined as the ratio of total labor expenses to gross output minus intermediate inputs.
-TFP growth (dtfp_kl) equals the five-year log-change in a given industry's multifactor productivity index (MFP)
-Price, ULC and Mark-up growth (Dlogp_kl, Dlogulc_kl and Dlogmu_kl, respectively) defined as described in section E.2.4 above.
• Leader Turnover (lead_turnover_mv): market-value based turnover rate, as defined in section XX above.
• Compustat firm-level leader investment gap (ikgap_cp): we roughly follow Crouzet and Eberly (2018) . Define the net investment rate for firm i in industry j as the log-change in (deflated) total capital, ∆ log(K P T ijt ), using the industry-level deflator from the BEA's fixed assets tables. Then, estimate ∆ log(K P T ijt ) = βQ jt + β 2 log(Age ijt ) + δ i + γ t + ε ijt , where we control for firm-age, industry average Q as well as firm and year fixed effects. The year fixed effects measure the annual investment gap.
